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Are Unequal Incarceration  




The genetic endowment of males makes them likelier than females to be 
perpetrators of violent crime and thus to end up in prison. Philippe Van 
Parijs notes this and raises a startling question: Is it not an injustice to 
males that their unchosen genetic endowment renders them likelier to 
suffer the harms of incarceration? In this brief response, I canvass some 
tempting avenues by which we might think we can dispel the puzzle, and 
argue that each is unsuccessful. This will disappoint those hoping for a 
refutation of the claim lurking behind Van Parijs’ question: that even as their 
criminal behavior is so profoundly harmful to so many innocent victims, 
male violent offenders are themselves somehow victims of injustice. I hope 
to show that this indignation-provoking claim is far more difficult to refute 
than we would have hoped, but also to suggest that it is far less threatening—
and less bizarre—than we might have feared.
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INTRODUCTION
In his fourth puzzle on gender equality, Philippe Van Parijs notes that the 
genetic endowment of males makes them likelier than females to be 
perpetrators of violent crime and thus to end up in prison.2 He raises a 
startling question: If the unchosen genetic endowment of males renders 
them likelier than females to suffer the harms of incarceration, could this 
be an injustice (Van Parijs 2015: 88) Plausibly, it adds to the injustice of 
poverty that those who grow up in poor families are likelier to be incarcerated 
1 I am grateful to Paula Casal, Jeff Behrends, Harry Brighouse, and three anonymous 
reviewers at Law, Ethics, and Philosophy for asking challenging questions and making valuable 
suggestions on previous drafts of this response.
2 For more on biological contributions to male crime, see Thornhill and Palmer 2000, 
Casal 2011, and Rainer 2013. For data on men’s greater criminality, see Greenfeld and Snell 2000.
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than their more privileged counterparts.3 Why, asks Van Parijs, do we have 
the intuition that the elevated risk to those born with these disadvantages is 
different than the elevated risk to those born with male genetic endowments?
Those who are concerned about ongoing injustices against women are 
likely, at first, to find these puzzles irritating. We might lament the opportunity 
costs of theorizing alleged injustices against men when women continue 
to be victimized by pervasive structural injustices, and worry that such 
theorizing will slow progress toward women’s equality. I share these 
worries. Still, hormonal inequalities may generate injustices against men 
even if this fact is troubling for those concerned to strengthen coalitions 
for social reform on behalf of women.
Of course, it is right that men be overrepresented among the prison 
population given that they commit more violent offenses. We must protect 
victims and potential victims, and incarceration presently offers the best 
means of doing so. But is the higher likelihood of incarceration among 
males unjust? The harms of incarceration can be severe. They include 
foregone opportunities for flourishing, alienation from spouses and children, 
enhanced risk of being oneself a victim of violence, and difficulty finding 
and keeping employment subsequent to release.4 If men are, through no 
fault of their own, likelier to suffer these harms, then we must at least 
entertain Van Parijs’ question—a puzzling question to be sure, since the 
putative injustice to men would result, most proximally, from their doing 
violence to their victims: often, women.
In this brief response, I canvass some tempting avenues by which we 
might think we can dispel the puzzle, and argue that each is unsuccessful. 
No doubt other avenues for response exist, but I consider what I take to be 
the most plausible. Having explored these possible responses and found 
them unsatisfying, I tentatively conclude that men’s higher likelihood of 
3 No doubt rates of incarceration would be higher in these communities even if 
crime rates were not, but I assume that part of this correlation is due to elevated crime rates. 
As Van Parijs says, elevated crime rates among the poor are “in part no doubt but not only 
because they tend to be sentenced more severely for the same crimes” (87).
4 See NA ACP Criminal Justice Fact Sheet. Some of these harms are intrinsic to 
incarceration, but some are contingent—incarceration need not be as harmful as we make 
it. I suspect that an elevated likelihood of criminal behavior is bad for offenders even if they 
are never caught: Whether or not they feel remorse for their crime, violent offenders are likely 
to experience greater difficulty maintaining or developing intimate relationships. Even those 
with a propensity to violence who never offend are likely to struggle to achieve and maintain the 
kinds of interpersonal relationships that, for so many, are crucial contributors to wellbeing, and 
they may be worse off for this whether or not they themselves judge it to be a loss. But nothing 
I say in the rest of this paper relies on the mere propensity to violence being harmful. All I will 
assume is that, on average, incarceration itself is harmful; I take it that any plausible metric of 
justice will have the resources to register it as such.
 Are Unequal Incarceration Rates Unjust to Men? 138
LEAP 3 (2015)
incarceration is a distinct injustice to men. This tentative conclusion is 
highly counterintuitive, but I suspect that a great deal of our resistance to 
it owes to worries about the strategies we might pursue to remedy the 
injustice. So I conclude by briefly sketching what seem to me some promising 
social policies to address inequalities in incarceration prospects—including 
unequal prospects based on sex, if it turns out that such inequalities are unjust 
to men.
How might we try to dispel the puzzle concerning men’s incarceration? 
I first consider some reasons for thinking there is no injustice at all. I then 
consider a response that grants that there is some injustice but maintains 
that it is overridden by the many injustices of which men are beneficiaries; 
this response acknowledges that there is an injustice to men, but maintains 
that it is of no practical consequence, for men are owed no recompense. 
1. NATURAL OR SOCIAL?
We might start by questioning Van Parijs’ causal claims. Are the differences 
between men and women that lead to men’s higher rates of violent crime 
really genetic, as he suggests? Isn’t it plausible that some of these behavioral 
differences are due in part to social or environmental influences? Plausibly, 
even if genetic differences are present, certain socialization practices 
exacerbate their effects: If young boys are encouraged or indulged more when 
they display aggression, or if they are indulged more in losses of temper 
because gender norms make us more tolerant of male anger than female 
anger, these trends might help explain men’s greater criminality. Even if 
they do, this does not dispel Van Parijs’ puzzle. If Rawls was right that 
social and natural contingencies are “equally arbitrary” from a moral point 
of view (1971/1999, p. 64), then social contingencies justify inequalities no 
more than natural contingencies. If we have reason of justice to mitigate 
unearned disadvantage, those reasons apply no less to the disadvantage that 
results from socialization than the disadvantage due to genes.
Even if social and natural contingencies are equally morally arbitrary 
in the sense that the person whom they disadvantage is equally non-
responsible for them, however, social contingencies at least seem to be 
within society’s control. Because society appears responsible for creating 
it, socially-caused disadvantage might be thought more urgently to call for 
remediation. I find this implausible. Suppose there really is a fact of the 
matter about the extent to which the causes of any particular disadvantage 
are social or natural. Still, socially-caused disadvantage need not, in 
principle, be more amenable to change by collective action, either by 
mitigating the disadvantage or by mitigating the social differences that 
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cause it. Neither genes nor their justice-relevant effects are immutable. In 
a paper on educational justice, Christopher Jencks asks us to consider two 
deaf children: One child’s deafness is due to an environmentally-caused 
early childhood disease; the other child’s deafness is due to a genetic defect. 
According to Jencks, “the fact that one child’s deafness was a product of 
heredity while the other child’s deafness was environmental in origin tells 
us nothing about the physical character of the problem or the likelihood 
that it has a medical remedy” (1988: 523).This point about immutability 
increasingly applies to the source of disadvantage as well, as social sources 
of disadvantage become increasingly complex and gene therapy becomes 
increasingly sophisticated. Whatever the source of men’s greater aggression, 
it could be addressed through collective social action—either by efforts to 
change socialization patterns, by existing gene selection and therapy, or by 
developing new technologies for genetic modification (Casal 2013, 2015, 2016; 
Rainier 2013).
But this is all largely beside the point. If men’s greater likelihood of 
criminality is due to social influences contrary to what Van Parijs claims, 
and if social inequalities do more urgently call for remediation contrary to 
what I have claimed, then we have only strengthened the grounds for 
thinking there is injustice here. But if Van Parijs is right to regard the 
difference as genetic, then we’re back to the puzzle we began with: Is it not 
unjust that genetic make-up renders men likelier than women to engage in 
violent behavior, thereby rendering them more susceptible to the harms of 
incarceration? Whatever configuration of social and natural causes are at 
work, they presumably make males likelier to be incarcerated because 
they make it more difficult for males than for females to avoid the kinds of 
behaviors that lead to incarceration. If so, then the influence of unchosen 
genetic or social endowment on males’ prospects for incarceration seems 
to be the sort of starting gate disadvantage that justice condemns.
2. HARM TO OTHERS?
Violent crime is deeply harmful. It harms victims, and its harms extend 
beyond its immediate victims; for example, it inflicts opportunity costs in 
the form of public resources spent on prosecution and incarceration rather 
than other socially valuable projects. Can we dispel the puzzle Van Parijs’ 
question raises by arguing that the serious and pervasive harms that crime 
inf licts tell against men’s greater likelihood of incarceration being an 
injustice to them? Is it a plausible condition for an ex ante inequality in life 
prospects to constitute an injustice that those on the losing end not harm 
others in accruing the deficit they were ex ante likelier to accrue? No. Just 
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as men are disproportionally likely to be incarcerated relative to women, 
the least advantaged are disproportionally likely to be incarcerated relative 
to the more advantaged. This elevated likelihood of incarceration is plausibly 
one dimension of the injustice suffered by those who grow up poor through 
no fault of their own, and this would be true even if the effects of poverty 
on incarceration were mediated entirely by actual criminality—that is, even 
if poverty did not elevate one’s likelihood of incarceration beyond the extent 
to which it elevates one’s likelihood of committing a crime. Similarly, the 
effects of hormones on men’s high likelihood of incarceration are mediated by 
their criminality—by their harming others. But to be consistent, we must 
regard their unequal propensity to criminality as no less unjust on that count. 
This is true even if, plausibly, men’s criminality and the criminality of those 
born into disadvantaged circumstances disproportionally victimize those 
who are already unjustly badly off themselves.
3. FREE CHOICE?
Genetic and hormonal differences may render men likelier than women to 
engage in certain behaviors, but whether or not any of us in fact engages in 
those behaviors is, at the end of the day, up to us. Van Parijs readily 
acknowledges that “the role played by free will in the causal process is by 
no means irrelevant” (86), and clarifies that his drawing attention to the 
role of genetics is meant in no way to exonerate men for their violent crimes. 
How, then, is men’s greater propensity to violence an injustice, if we acknowledge 
that choice plays a role in determining whether any particular man acts on 
this propensity? If we are right to hold individuals accountable for the 
choices they make, even when factors beyond their control affect their 
likelihood of making those choices, why should we think that men suffer 
injustice due to the genetic endowments that make them, on average, likelier 
to be violent? 
Consider the income inequality between women and men. Some of the 
inequality is due to outright sexism, and some to implicit biases or statistical 
discrimination that render women less likely to be hired and promoted 
whether or not they are or will become caregiving specialists, simply because 
they are statistically more likely to be caregiving specialists. Another cause 
of income inequality is unequal uptake of unpaid caregiving labor between 
men and women. Women take more time off for caregiving and more 
frequently work part-time so that they can perform caregiving. Full time 
working women have more caregiving constraints on their availability for 
overtime work or travel and are likelier to be on call for caregiving emergencies. 
They are also likelier to develop career aspirations in light of anticipating 
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that they will be the caregiving specialist within their families; they are thus 
likelier to choose the relatively flexible (and less socially valued) careers that 
will enable them to prioritize caregiving.
Some might think that if men’s higher incomes are due to sexist bosses, 
that’s unjust; but if the inequality is due to women’s occupational or work-
life balance choices, it is not unjust. This is a mistake. Women do indeed 
choose how to divide their time and energy, but they do not choose against 
a background of equality. Due to genes or socialization or both, women are 
likelier than men to subordinate the demands of paid labor to the demands 
of caregiving. Relative to men, women’s options about how to allocate time 
and energy come with different constraints and payoffs. To make the 
counter-gender-typical choice of prioritizing paid labor, the average woman 
will have to overcome either ingrained social norms or a natural predisposition 
to prioritize others’ needs for care, or both; and she will have to pay the costs 
of violating social norms that cast women as “cold” or “hard” for prioritizing 
paid labor and as “bitchy” or “domineering” for success in paid labor, which 
success itself will have to be won in a competition the terms of which largely 
favor men. So while women do indeed choose which careers to pursue and 
how to prioritize those careers against other life projects, we nonetheless 
rightly object to the terms of that choice: Women who choose less esteemed 
and less well–remunerated positions face higher costs than men for choosing 
more esteemed and better remunerated alternatives. Women who choose 
to shoulder more than their share of the caregiving load do so against a 
context that makes it costlier for them than for their male partners to resist 
doing so.5,6
Clearly, there are important differences between women’s choices to 
prioritize the needs of dependents over paid labor and men’s engagement 
in violent crime. My point is not to claim that they are analogous, but to 
make one very specific comparison: Both involve choice. Considerations of 
justice must be responsibility-sensitive, and so the role of choice is not 
5 One might think that diagnosing this social context of choice as unjust requires a 
welfarist metric of justice. I deny this, and in fact think it would be a mistake to invoke such 
a metric. I offer an account of the injustice of the gendered division of labor—an account that 
does not rely on a welfarist metric—in Schouten (forthcoming). Nor does the case for regarding 
the gendered division of labor as unjust rely on assuming that men and women have different 
preferences; rather, the arrangement of institutions that makes transgressing gender norms 
so costly is unjust.
6 One might point out that the unfair terms of choice are due to men’s intransigence. I 
do not think this is relevant for the point I am making here, which is about whether the 
consequences of choice can be unjust to the chooser if the terms of the choice are unfair 
through no fault of the chooser. I do not think that others’ culpability bears on that question, 
though it is certainly relevant to others. Moreover, I do not think that the unfairness of terms 
is due primarily to men’s intransigence, as will become clear below.
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insignificant. But in both cases, the inequalities in the background against 
which the relevant choice is made are not chosen; and in both cases, the 
relevant choice is harmful to the chooser. Women are worse off in many 
domains by virtue of making gender-norm-compliant labor allocation 
choices (as well as by the norms themselves, whether or not the women 
comply with them), and these harms have long been a concern of theorists 
of justice. Men are made worse off by virtue of committing violent crimes 
that result in their disproportionate incarceration. Through no fault of 
their own, women are ex ante likelier to be worse off in virtue of their 
greater likelihood to prioritize the needs of dependents over their careers. 
Through no fault of their own, men are ex ante likelier to be worse off in 
virtue of their greater like lihood to engage in violent behavior. Perhaps the 
unequal propensities in the two cases are due to different configurations 
of social and natural causes. But if we are committed to neutralizing the 
influence on our life prospects of circumstances beyond our control, then 
this difference is irrelevant to our deeming it unjust that unchosen contingencies 
impact on life prospects in these ways. 
Men should not be exculpated merely on the basis of their ex ante elevated 
likelihood of criminality any more than women’s gender-compliant choices 
should be disparaged as not genuine choices. For the purpose of theorizing 
justice, we want to be able to hold agents responsible for the choices they 
make even when alternative courses are very costly; thus, we must attribute 
to individuals the capacity to make costly choices. This capacity is the basis 
on which we hold perpetrators responsible for their crimes and respect women’s 
gender-compliant choices. But in neither case does the role of choice exempt 
the backdrop against which choices are made from criticism on the grounds 
of justice. Just as the norms and institutions that make gender egalitarianism 
so costly may be unjust, so too it might be unjust that social structures permit 
men’s unchosen genetic endowment so heavily to impact their likelihood 
of incarceration. We have seen that the effects of natural contingencies are 
not categorically immutable. If the incarceration effects of male hormones 
are not immutable—and I shall tentatively suggest in concluding that they 
are not—then the element of choice in criminal behavior does not exempt 
society from an obligation to intervene to lessen the likelihood of the harm: 
in the case of incarceration, by expending social resources to make violent 
crime less common.7
7 I have not argued positively that society does have such an obligation; rather, I have 
argued more modestly that the role of choice would not lessen or undermine it if we did. 
Moreover, social resources are scarce, and the question of how to prioritize remediation of 
the various injustices we confront is complicated. Even if we do have the obligation I consider 
here, it may be that in our non-ideal circumstances other obligations of justice must take priority.
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4. AN INJUSTICE OVERRIDDEN?
Suppose there is some injustice in men’s higher likelihood of incarceration. 
Still, we might think that, given the very many ways in which women are 
disadvantaged relative to men, that injustice is simply overridden by the many 
gendered harms to women of which men are beneficiaries. Indeed, some of 
the very features that plausibly help explain men’s greater likelihood of 
incarceration also have disadvantageous consequences for women: Men are, 
on average, physically larger and stronger than women and so likelier to be 
successful when they undertake to commit a violent crime; this physical 
strength and stature might be a disservice to the men who are incarcerated 
for the crimes they successfully carry out, but those traits are much more 
pervasively a threat to women. 
Of course, even if men are all-things-considered advantaged such that 
they are owed no recompense in virtue of their higher likelihood of 
incarceration, that disadvantage might still matter. If the various constituents 
of good lives are commensurable such that gains in one domain can make 
up for losses in others, any justice-relevant disadvantage men suffer might 
simply diminish the compensation owed to women on account of gender 
injustice favoring men. 
But it is not obvious that the putative disadvantage to men would be 
relevant merely for lessening the compensation owed to women. Many 
candidate goods of justice—work, income, and leisure—appear to be 
commensurable in this way. But it is not always true that being advantaged 
in one way can compensate for being disadvantaged in another—that if 
the quantities and severities match up correctly, there is no injustice all 
things considered. Some goods are not commensurable. Certain health 
deficits that involve chronic pain plausibly cannot be outweighed by 
surpluses of other goods like income and wealth, or even by surpluses of 
goods that we regard, like health, as intrinsic constituents of wellbeing—
intellectual stimulation, for example. Similarly, it may be that men’s greater 
likelihood of committing violent crime is a disadvantage that cannot be 
compensated for by other goods, even goods in such important domains 
as those in which men appear to be favored, including social status and 
occupied positions of political power. None of this is meant to deny that 
the goods of which men enjoy unfairly large shares are very good goods; 
nor is it to deny that their large shares constitute an injustice. It is simply to 
point out that the impact on one’s life of certain kinds of bads cannot fully 
be remediated by a larger share of goods. Presumably, the harm of suffering 
physical assault is such a bad. We may regard the harms of incarceration as 
similarly un-compensable without thereby committing to men’s susceptibility 
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to suffering them being a disadvantage comparable in severity to women’s 
vulnerability to assault.
Here we might be tempted to think that the badness of men’s greater 
incarceration is not best characterized as unjust. Maybe the world is somehow 
worse in virtue of this inequality, but justice is about the distribution of 
commensurables. If men’s higher likelihood of criminality cannot be 
outweighed by the very many advantages they have in virtue of being men, 
then it is not unjust. 
Justice cannot plausibly be restricted in this way, because such a restriction 
would also exclude paradigmatic cases of gender injustice. Consider the 
incommensurable harms of the gendered division of labor which account—at 
least in part—for our regarding it as unjust. Imagine, counterfactually, that 
traditionally male and traditionally female work were esteemed and remunerated 
at comparable levels. Still, the persistence of social norms and institutions 
arranged in compliance with those norms could make gender-counter-typical 
choices very costly for both men and women. The costs of transgressing gender 
norms within institutions that affirm those norms can constitute justice-
relevant harms, even if gender-norm-compliant alternatives resulted in 
equal distributions of commensurables between women and men. On this 
basis, I argue elsewhere that the gendered division of labor could remain 
unjust even if caregiving work were compensated and its status elevated 
such that esteem and remuneration accrued equally to traditionally male 
and traditionally female work (2016). But at the very least, it is coherent to 
claim that the gendered division of labor could be unjust despite all 
commensurable goods being fairly distributed. If so, then the concept of justice 
must extend beyond commensurables.
The injustice of the gendered division of labor also shows that a justice-
relevant, incommensurable disadvantage can remain justice-relevant when 
the disadvantaged group enjoys a surplus of different incommensurable 
goods. If we are to take seriously the insight that we presently fail to value 
caregiving in proportion to its true worth—both in terms of the public 
good that caregivers generate and in terms of the personal value of intimacy 
that caregiving enables—then we must accept that women are not the only 
parties harmed by the gendered division of labor. Just as many women 
would have been better off with more opportunities for stimulation and 
esteem in the world of paid work, many men would have been better off 
with more opportunities for the intimacy and fulfillment that caregiving 
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enables.8 Women are harmed by their sub-optimal share of paid work, and 
men are harmed by a sub-optimal share of caregiving work. Of course, these 
harms are not of equal magnitude for women and men. But suppose, again, 
that traditionally female work were remunerated and esteemed equally with 
traditionally male work. Under these circumstances, the harms of a gendered 
division of labor could be equal in their extent and severity. Still, it would 
remain unjust that men and women are so thoroughly socialized in ways 
that make it very costly for them to attain what for so many of them is an 
important good, where the basis of this socialization is nothing more than 
(faulty) (institutionalized) assumptions about who is best suited to or equipped 
for different kinds of work. For those who would find fulfillment through 
non-caregiving work, a deficit in that domain cannot fully be compensated 
by larger allocations of commensurable goods or even by larger allocations 
of other non-commensurable goods. For those who would find fulfillment 
through caregiving, a deficit in that domain is similarly incommensurable. 
Still, none of this makes it incoherent to think of the gendered division of 
labor as a problem of justice. The gendered division of labor could remain 
unjust even if (counterfactually) it imposed only incommensurable harms, 
and even if (counterfactually) the harms accrued in equal magnitudes to 
men and women. Similarly, men’s greater likelihood of incarceration could 
be unjust despite the harms it inflicts being incommensurable, and it could 
remain unjust even though women suffer incommensurable harms of even 
greater magnitude. 
Because these (putative) injustices cannot fully be compensated by 
surpluses of other goods, to fully restore justice we must remove the ex ante 
inequality—by changing the gendered socialization patterns and institutional 
arrangements that sustain the gendered division of labor on the one hand; 
by removing or overcoming men’s genetic or social propensity for violence 
on the other. In other words, fully remediating these injustices requires 
reform of social institutions rather than straightforward redistribution of 
goods. In one sense, this is nothing new. Even straightforward income and 
wealth inequalities might be best addressed not by giving more to those whose 
share is unfairly small, but rather by making careful and empirically-informed 
8 It is tempting to think that if a dearth of caregiving really made men worse off, they 
would simply do more of it. But, first, even if their small share of caregiving work is simply 
due to their own intransigence, they might nonetheless be better off doing more. Just as 
women’s socialization (or genetic endowment) affects their preferences and the choices 
they make, so too might men’s. Second, there is evidence that men increasingly do prefer 
gender egalitarian partnerships and a larger share of caregiving work, but worry that 
“mounting job demands and a lack of caretaking supports” make egalitarianism not a viable 
option (Gerson 2010: 11). In other words, many of the same factors that make egalitarianism 
so costly for women—not intransigent partners but intransigent workplaces, for example—
also make it costly for men.
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institutional changes to schools, zoning policies, or campaign finance regimes.9 
The difference is that, when we are dealing with commensurables, redistributing 
goods can still, in principle, fully restore justice, albeit perhaps less efficiently. 
When the injustice involves incommensurables, redistributing goods is not 
only less efficient; it falls short of fully restoring justice. If incarceration inflicts 
incommensurable harms, then men’s greater likelihood of incarceration might 
call for redress despite the very many inequalities from which they benefit. 
5. UNJUST BUT NOT URGENT?
Men’s many advantages do not render hormonal inequality irrelevant from 
the perspective of justice, but perhaps their advantages render it a less 
urgent injustice. Plausibly, hormonal differences that disadvantage men 
are less urgent than many of the inequalities that disadvantage women. 
Still, I question how far this can take us in resolving the cognitive dissonance 
Van Parijs’ puzzle generates. The fact that men enjoy so many advantages 
in virtue of their gender may well depress the urgency of remedying the 
disadvantageous consequences of hormonal inequalities, but other 
considerations should figure into our calculations of urgency as well: How 
severe is the harm? How pervasive? How difficult is it to avoid? Are the 
advantages which its victims enjoy commensurable advantages? Judging 
from these questions, we can see that many injustices against women are 
exceedingly urgent problems of justice. We routinely fail to make women 
safe in public spaces from threat of violence and assault. The resulting 
harms are severe, pervasive, and exceedingly difficult for women to avoid. 
We should try to ease these harms, but their seeming incommensurability 
would make them impossible fully to remediate, which makes it urgent 
indeed to do what we can to avoid them in the first place.
Where do the harms of men’s greater likelihood of incarceration fall 
along these metrics of urgency? They are presumably less urgent than the 
harm women disproportionally suffer in virtue of living under threat of 
violence, but neither can the influence of unchosen genetic endowment on 
men’s likelihood of imprisonment be dismissed as unimportant. I do not 
know how difficult it is for those with the genetic endowment in question 
to avoid criminality. But surely the harms of incarceration are severe and 
pervasive: The Bureau of Justice reports that, as of the year 2000, male 
violent offenders made up “about one violent offender for every nine males 
age ten or older” (Greenfeld and Snell 2000). If the harms of incarceration 
 
9 This is not a claim that these issues no longer fall within the purview of distributive 
justice. The injustices might be distributive even if the ideal remedies are not redistribution.  
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are incommensurable, that would heighten the urgency of finding ways to 
avoid them. 
Even if I am wrong about this assessment of urgency, moreover, relative 
non-urgency does not exempt us from responsibility to theorize and address 
injustices. The harms of the present day gendered division of labor are, on 
any plausible measurement, less urgent than the harms of institutionalized 
practices of female genital mutilation. But concern over the persistence of 
the latter has not prevented a great deal of attention to the former, and this 
is as it should be, assuming we can maintain perspective and allocate scarce 
resources and attention appropriately. On reflection, the unjust consequences 
of hormonal inequality seem relatively urgent; but even less urgent injustices 
merit attention.
6. WHAT TO DO?
Men’s genetic or socialized propensity to aggression is a circumstance beyond 
t heir control. We should be committed, as a matter of just ice, to 
minimizing the effects of such circumstances on life prospects. This comes 
to us as puzzling, because we are accustomed to thinking of women as being 
victims of gender injustice. No doubt readers will have other ideas for how 
to dispel the puzzle, or ideas for how more effectively to execute the 
resolutions I have considered. I welcome such ideas. Diagnosing sex-based 
unequal prospects for incarceration as unjust is counterintuitive, and I am 
open to the possibility that creative maneuvers to avoid this diagnosis can 
be made to work. But it seems to me that we must also reflect on the status 
of the intuition being contradicted. At one extreme, we might treat it as a 
desideratum of a theory of justice that it not diagnose the unequal likelihood 
of incarceration between the sexes as unjust, or that it not do so when males 
comprise the disadvantaged group. This would too strongly privilege the 
intuition that men are not victims of injustice in Van Parijs’ puzzle. A weaker 
way to privilege the intuition would be to treat it as a sufficiently reliable 
piece of data to justify creative refinement of our theories of justice to 
accommodate it. At some point, though, the creativity of our maneuvers will 
come at the cost of the plausibility of the theories. If the intuition is so reliable, 
that cost might be worth bearing. But at some point, ingenious maneuvers 
become at best ad hoc and at worst implausible on their own terms. There 
are certainly options I have not considered, and some of them may impose 
no plausibility cost to the best theory of justice. But suppose not. What amount 
of “plausibility points” should we be willing to sacrifice in our theories of 
justice to preserve the intuition that unequal likelihood of incarceration is 
not unjust to men? I don’t know. But for two reasons, I think that it would 
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not be the disaster we might at first have thought it to be if we had to admit 
that our intuition in this case is misguided.
First, we have long known that certain gender inequalities harm men as 
well as women. Men have historically been discouraged from developing 
the kind of intimacy with their children that makes parenting so rewarding 
for some. They have been encouraged to regard paid employment as 
fundamentally important to their self-worth and role in society. There is 
no denying that men have been mal-formed under patriarchy in ways that 
constitute real harms to them, and acknowledging these harms as dimensions 
of gender injustice takes nothing away from the urgency of addressing harms 
suffered by women, who remain the prime victims of gender injustice. Nor 
should acknowledging an injustice in incarceration prospects detract from our 
commitment to the diverse array of feminist goals that we’ve long recognized 
as morally urgent.
Second, if our intuition that there is no injustice here turns out to be 
misguided, the practical upshots are not the unpalatable measures we may 
have feared but rather social policy measures that we already have independent 
reason to undertake. Certainly we should work to ameliorate the harms of 
incarceration by making prisons safer, but this does not mean that we should 
decriminalize violence, exonerate its perpetrators, or lessen any of our efforts 
to better protect victims of violence. From the fact that a man’s propensity to 
violence is beyond his control, it does not follow that he should be exonerated 
for acting on that propensity. If they can be shown to be safe and effective, 
we might incorporate technological solutions to lower recidivism, for example 
offering male offenders drug or gene therapies to lessen aggressiveness.10And 
while it is a far less exotic proposal, I think we have reasons to be optimistic that 
education reform could lower men’s likelihood of incarceration.11 High quality 
early childhood education might better enable boys to manage and process 
anger. Arts and enrichment programming throughout primary and secondary 
school might help them find healthy outlets for it. Lengthening school days 
and school years could diminish students’ availability for gang activity, drug 
use, and other behaviors that raise the likelihood of subsequent criminality. 
This strategy could be especially effective among students, like boys from 
10 For more on these possibilities, see Persson and Savulescu 2012, Casal 2011, 2013, 
and 2015.
11 There are good reasons to worry about educational programs aimed at changing 
people’s propensities to engage in certain behaviors. Indeed, many such efforts can be 
ineffective and even oppressive (Casal 2016). But evidence suggests that non-oppressive 
education initiatives can be effective in reducing criminality. For example, studies of early 
childhood educational interventions, like Perry pre-school and the Abecedarian Project, 
show that test scores improved in the short term, but faded out quickly, while other benefits 
associated with the interventions (including lack of involvement in the criminal justice 
system) persisted. See, e.g., Heckman et al. (2010). See also Machin et al. 2010 and Deming 2011.
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poor communities with high levels of unemployment, whose intersectional 
group membership further elevates their risk. Perhaps most importantly, 
education reform could mitigate the severe deprivation and hopelessness 
that often lead to criminality. Well-educated students have more options for 
meaningful life pursuits, more developed capital to make those pursuits 
successful, and higher opportunity costs to criminality. For these reasons 
and others, we should work to diminish the extreme inequality in our society 
through education reform and other forms of social support. It might seem 
as though education reform could only make a difference if the problem had 
its root in social causes, but this impression is mistaken. Just as corrective 
lenses can improve poor vision whether it has environmental or natural 
causes, education could offset whatever environmental influences raise 
men’s likelihood of incarceration and lessen the likelihood that they will act 
on—or raise the likelihood that they will resist acting on—any natural 
predisposition toward criminality they happen to have. In short: Whether 
men’s greater propensity to violent crime is due to genes or socialization or 
both, social solutions like education reform could help reduce their likelihood 
of acting on that propensity.
Perhaps, if all this fails, we will have to accept that the problem, at present, 
cannot be ameliorated, or that it cannot be ameliorated without making the 
world more unjust overall than it is if we tolerate this disadvantage to men. 
If so, some might think that the disadvantage is therefore not unjust. I doubt 
that injustice is limited in this way, if only because restricting the concept 
based on what we are presently able to redress risks removing reasons to 
develop new mechanisms for redress. But even if the concept is rightly limited 
in that way, we should not accept the conclusion suggested without having 
made a good faith effort to deploy the kinds of social solutions conjectured 
here. I have suggested that they hold promise for reducing the influence of 
hormones on men’s criminality, and there is little reason to doubt that, if 
they can be made to do so, they could do so without imposing decisive costs to 
other pursuits of justice.
It is indeed counterintuitive to think that men are victims of injustice 
because their genetic or social endowment makes them likelier to end up 
in prison. It might nonetheless be true. If so, then many of the social policies 
that could mitigate the injustice are policies about which we should have 
little reservation. Indeed, many of them are long overdue.
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